Philosophy of Policy Ethics Final
Philosophy of Policy
Professor Sanjay Pandey
Final Paper
Carl Mackensen
Objective Ethics Examined: Counter Arguments, Philosophical Frameworks, and Conclusions
Introduction
This paper examines whether Objectivity can be found in Ethics. This refers to there
being universally true statements of right and wrong. It is of paramount importance to policy, as well as our individual lives, to determine whether right and wrong exist universally, or are merely always shifting based on other external factors. Here, I detail what objective ethics is, then go on to examine some potential critiques of it, before concluding with looking at some contenders for which ethical system is most defensible should objectivity exist.
Part One: What is Objective Ethics?
Objective Ethics, simply put, is the position that there exists statements of right and wrong that are universally true. Such a system has been sought since prehistoric times by people in any and all places, and different times and cultures have come up with different views of what is right and wrong, defensible and not, morally praiseworthy and otherwise. To me, Objective Ethics, in the secular sense, is the guide by which we know how humans can best flourish in this world. It takes into account what type of being humans are, and what, as a result, it means to be human in the world. I believe that there exist moral truths that are not only objective, but transcendental. This means that they would remain true even if all humans would cease to be tomorrow. But this is not the place to detail that argument, rather, it is the purpose of this paper to argue first for objective ethics, and then detail some of the most historically prominent systems of belief in place that promulgate this. I hope to construct a system that is of use to me personally, moving forward. For, truly, ethics is nothing more than mere navel gazing if it is not put into practice.
Part Two: Cultural Relativism
It has oft been said, “when in Rome, do as the Romans do.” This, in essence, is at the heart of the Cultural Relativism argument. Different societies, whether separate geographically or in time, have different rules. As such, when operating within a society, we should abide by those rules. These rules are not universal, they are specific to the culture. As such, there is no sensible way to construe an ‘objective morality,’ as everything depends on the culture in question. In sum, “different cultures have different moral codes. What is right within one group may horrify another group, and vice versa.” (Rachels, Page 14). An example from Herodotus is that of the Greeks and the Callatians. The burying practices of the two widely diverged, with the former burning their dead, and the latter eating theirs. If you were to ask either member of each respective group about the practice of the other, they would be horrifies and exclaim it as an afront to the Gods. But within this comparison is the essence of cultural relativism. Neither group is ‘right,’ there are only differing sentiments that are culture bound and determine how we should react.
Another example is that of the Eskimos, examined by Freuchen. “The Eskimos…seemed to care less about human life. Infanticide…was common…When elderly family members became too feeble, they were left out in the snow to die.” (Rachels, Page 15). Compared to a Western audience, these practices would seem barbaric. However, to Eskimo communities, they are routinely practiced and make perfect sense within the logic of their society. Again, this is the crux of cultural relativism. “To call a custom ‘correct’ or ‘incorrect’ would imply that we can judge it by some independent or objective standard of right and wrong. But in fact, we would merely be judging it by the standards of our own culture. No independent standard exists; every standard is culture-bound.” (Rachels, Page 16). When we bring critiques to a practice, we are viewing that practice within our own construct, and, as such, this is an unfair manner in which to treat another society. This is perhaps most intuitively rooted in the feeling that we don’t want someone else judging our own common place behavior as abhorrent, so we should not do this to others. “Cultural relativism says…that there are is no such thing as universal truth in ethics; there are only the various cultural codes.” (Rachels, Page 16)
In brief, the language of the Cultural Differences Argument can be constructed thusly:
1) Different cultures have different moral codes
2) Therefore, there is no objective truth in morality. Right and wrong are only matters of opinion, and opinions vary from culture to culture
(Rachels, Page 18). However, upon closer examination, the conclusion does not follow from the premise. The stated premise deals with the beliefs of people, while the conclusion deals with what is actually truly so. It is perfectly plausible that the members of certain societies may simply be incorrect. A good example of this comes from the debate around a flat versus round Earth. It is clear that only one of these groups is correct. While moral issues seem a bit murkier than hard scientific facts, with a little thought and logic, we can often find a similar parallel.
What would it mean if Cultural Relativism was actually true? It would mean a number of things. Most notably, this would include,
1) We could no longer say that the customs of other societies are morally inferior to our own.
2) We could no longer criticize the code of our own society.
3) The idea of moral progress is called into doubt.
(Rachels, Pages 19 to 20). On the first point, we would not be able to condemn other actions found in different societies. On the face of things this may seem positive, as we certainly don’t want to encourage bigotry. However, what about a starker example, such as Nazi Germany, or female genital mutilation? Do we truly want to say that there are no circumstances whatsoever in which members of one group can’t criticize members of another? These examples make it clear that this is not the case. Further, we wouldn’t be able to criticize our own activities. All acts would be relative to the time and place that they occurred, and as such, could not be judged by history. Again, on the face of things this would seem desirable, as a certain amount of historical context is required to understand any activity or action. When we look at serious examples, however, this once more falls away. Do we want to be able to say that slavery was justified because it was the common practice of 1600s England and its empire? Certainly not. We have made moral progress since then. Again, this argument falls by the wayside. Lastly, we wouldn’t be able to say that we’ve made progress at all for similar reasons. As alluded to in response to the slavery argument above, this is clearly not the case. We should always have a certain historical context to our judgements, but to say that contemporary Germany is better than Nazi Germany is not a far reach in terms of realistic moral statements.
We may differ in our beliefs, but at our core we do not differ in our values. “Often, what seems to be a big difference turns out to be no difference at all.” (Rachels, Page 21). Just because two societies differ in customs, this does not mean they differ in values. Two good examples brought up above are the Eskimos, and the Greeks and Callatians. From the outside, the Eskimo practices may seem broadly condemnable. They kill babies, and leave the elderly to die. After a little bit of examination, however, we find that they are not so different from ourselves. Freuchen details how both of these activities are needed for the general health of the population. Female babies are killed because males are the ones that grow up to do the hunting which is requisite for survival. Were more females allowed to grow and mature, they would drain the resources of the whole, potentially leading to the entire collapse of the society. The same can be said of the elderly. As such, the Eskimos are simply engaging in something that every society does; that of self maintenance and survival. Similarly, regarding the burial customs, each society believed that they were honoring their dead. While burning or eating the dead may seem abhorrent to members of each respective culture, within the culture they are engaging in activities that stem from the same values.
Elaborating on this point, there are some values that are necessary to have a society at all. This includes some of the classics of child rearing, murder, and lying. Were everyone to simply lie to each other, or the threat of being killed ever present, or children not looked after until they could take care of themselves, these societies would simply not exist. “There are some moral rules that all societies must embrace, because those rules are necessary for societies to exist…Not every moral rule can vary from society to society.” (Rachels, Pages 23 to 24). Many who consider an action deplorable may be hesitant to outright call it wrong,. There are three main reasons for this.
1) First, there is an understandable nervousness about interfering in the social customs of other people.
2) Second, people may feel, rightly enough, that we should be tolerant of other cultures.
3) Finally, people may be reluctant to judge because they do not want to express contempt for the society being criticized.
(Rachels, Page 26). All of these points are valid and well thought out. However, when we introduce a stark example, we can again get some insight into what is truly the case. This time, let’s examine female genital mutilation. Based on a series of articles in the New York Times by Dugger, in many countries, this takes the form of the removal of the clitoris, or other damage done to the sexual organs of females. This is expressly done so that they do not experience sexual pleasure, and as such, so the argument goes, are better wives for they are less likely to cheat on their husbands. Surely we must feel less squeamish about condemning such a deplorable act, aside from any attempts at being polite or considerate. It is obvious on its face that these practices are not acceptable, and fall outside the realm of any notions of interfering, or tolerance, or showing contempt.
In brief, then, we find that cultural relativism is not defensible for a number of reasons. As with many thought experiments, this becomes expressly clear when we engage in serious consideration of the implications of the theory. If we consider Nazism, or slavery, or female genital mutilation, we see that it is not simply enough to ‘live as the Romans do’ and turn a blind eye to bad action. What we can deduce instead is that there are truly values that are universal, though they express themselves in different ways, and that at times some cultural practices go against these values. Whether they are the values required to have a society at all, or more specific regarding the treatment of a minority group, we can determine that some activity is simply reprehensible.
Part Three: Subjectivism
A similar, though different, source of attack on objective universal ethics is that of Subjectivism. Specifically, “ethical Subjectivism is the theory that our moral opinions are based on our feelings and nothing more…According to this theory, there is no such thing as right or wrong.” (Rachels, Page 34). A good example of this would be the debate over the legalization of Gay Marriage between former senator Mike Pence, and the head of the Human Rights Group, the group responsible for lobbying for marriage equality. Both feel they are correct, and we can not say whether one side is actually so or otherwise. Under subjectivism, they are simply competing views, each of which is an opinion to be respected. “If ethics has no objective basis, then morality is all just opinion, and our sense that some things are ‘really’ right or ‘really’ wrong is just an illusion.” (Rachels, Page 35)
There are several flavors of subjectivism. The first is Simple Subjectivism. In essence, what this entails is, “when a person says that something is morally good or bad, this means that he or she approves of that thing, or disapproves of it, and nothing more.” (Rachels, Page 35). Approval or disapproval is not in any way an indicator of whether something is objectively right or wrong, it is merely a statement of preference. However, following this tack to its logical conclusion, there is no room for disagreement. “When one person says ‘X is morally acceptable,’ and someone else says, ‘X is morally unacceptable,’ they are disagreeing. However, if Simple Subjectivism were correct, then they would not be.” (Rachels, Page 35). As such, we find that simple subjectivism doesn’t stand up to scrutiny.
A second approach is that of Emotivism. Under this view, “moral language is not fact-stating; it is not used to convey information. It is used, first, as a means of influencing people’s behavior…the utterance is more like a command than a statement of fact…Second, moral language is used to express attitudes.” (Rachels, Page 37). For Emotivism, then, moral conflict exists in a way that it does not under simple subjectivism. However, in our pronouncement that moral utterances are not fact stating, we miss something of the truth. Statements may be of attitude or beliefs, but they are also ways to make a statement about the trueness of falsehood of a moral statement. Disagreement takes several forms. It can be in belief or attitude. Under emotivism, moral disagreement is the latter.
Lastly, there is the The Error Theory, articulated by Mackie. Ethics does not contain facts under this view, and people are never right or wrong. However, it is the case that people believe that they are right. As such, we should construe them as attempting to put forward objective statements.
At the heart of Ethical Subjectivism is a theory of value and epistemology called Nihilism. Nihilists believe that values are not real, that these things are unknowable, or not comprehensible by the human mind. People may believe this or that in terms of moral beliefs, but in reality nothing is either right or wrong, or good or bad. Competing claims are neither reports of our own attitudes (Simple Subjectivism) or expressions of our feelings (Emotivism), but instead they are errors made by fallible humans. Different sides make a statement about morality which is incorrect, as there are no values on which to base them. As such, we conclude that there are no moral claims at all. This is the heart of Nihilism.
This may appeal for complex or hard to tease out moral issues, but it is less convincing for stark examples, such as Nazism, Slavery, Genital Mutilation, and so on. Defeating Nihilism is to defeat Subjectivism altogether. Nietzsche famously said that God is dead, and we have killed him. It is in the tradition of Western Philosophy, that with increased scrutiny, different moral positions have risen and fallen, only to eventually be discarded as incorrect, outdated, or inapplicable. This concludes with mid 20th Century philosophy such as Existentialism as articulated by Sartre, or Absurdism as detailed by Camus. These are competing ways in which to view the world, and ways to address Nihilism. Both were grown out of World War II, and both were in vogue for a time. More recently, with the advent of contemporary philosophy such as feminism and post modernism, the debate over objectivity has resurfaced. In the remainder of this paper, having articulated cultural relativity and subjectivism, I will discuss three main contenders for the basis on which to build a universal morality. The first is Virtue Ethics, as detailed by Aristotle, the second is Utilitarianism, as described by Mill, and the last is Deontology, as articulated by Kant.
Part Four: Virtue Ethics
Aristotle puts forward that the goodness of man is Virtue, and that this is what all humans should strive for. His core concern is what traits of character make someone good? This is indivisible from a life of reason, as seen from the ancient Greek point of view. Anscombe believes that secular philosophy has drifted too far from its Greek roots. Modern moral philosophy, under her view, is not logical as it operates on a system of ‘law without a lawgiver.’ This is an expression of the secular nature of philosophy today. Instead, traditional values of virtues within a person, such as courage, truthfulness, self control, diligence, kindness, and so on.
Aristotle articulated that a virtue is a habituated action that is expressing a trait of character. Vices, however, are similar. The difference is that virtues are good, and vices bad. Virtues are praiseworthy, while vices and condemnable. People who are virtuous are attractive to us, and those who are vice ridden are repellant. However, different people serve different utilities for us, and as such, we seek out different things in different people. We want different things in a doctor and in a president. However, we also evaluate people as just that; people. As such, we can come to the idea of a good person. As such, virtues are aspects that are habituated expressions of character which are good for any person to have.
Which attributes can be described as virtues by Aristotle? For him, virtues resided at the middle point between vices. Between the vices of cowardice and foolhardiness lies the virtue of courage. Cowardice is a paucity, while foolhardiness an over expression. Aristotle considered courage to be the primary virtue, as it is a requisite for the pursuit of all other harmonic means between vices, or other virtues. Geach, a recent philosopher, however took issue with this. He said, “Courage in an unworthy cause is no virtue; still less is courage in an evil cause. Indeed I prefer not to call this non-virtuous facing of danger ‘courage.’ (Geach, page 114). For Geach, this is because there are many actions that may seem courageous, but when in service of evil, are actually condemnable. Similarly, Plato in his meditation Euthyphro, describes a situation in which a son is called on to testify upon his father in a murder trial. Socrates debates whether this should take place, but Euthyphro sees this as no means of badness. While murder is certainly murder, it could be argued that there are other virtues at play that should also intervene in this behavior, namely, being a good family member. (Tredennick et al, pages 19 to 41). As such, there is more to virtue ethics than Aristotle originally articulated.
We must ask, why are virtues good? An appropriate response differs based on the virtue in question. Having courage is important for different reasons than being honest, or being loyal to family. In the end, Aristotle says, “virtues are important because the virtuous person will fare better in life.” (Rachels, page 178). As such, Aristotle’s entire meditation is a treatise on human flourishing, and not merely a collection of admonitions about what should and shouldn’t be done in different circumstances. To truly flourish as a person, one must be virtuous. Should we ask the same virtues of all people? Nietzsche said no. Specifically, on the topic, he argued, “How naïve it is altogether to say: ‘Man ought to be such-and-such!’ Reality shows us an enchanting wealth of types, the abundance of a lavish play and change of forms – and some wretched loafer of a moralist comments: ‘No! Man ought to be different.’ He even knows what man should be like, this wretched bigot and prig: he paints himself on the wall and comments, ‘Ecce homo!’ (Behold the man!). (Kaufmann, page 491). As such, we can construe that virtues should differ from person to person somewhat. Human flourishing differs because people are different, have different attributes and personalities, occupy different roles, and so on. The response by Aristotle is that certain virtues are required at all times and in all places. No matter how different people may be, or societies may grow, certain virtues are required for human flourishing in any and all circumstances. This is because all humans share certain basic conditions. Aristotle devoted a large section of his work to friendship, and political involvement. He called humans the ‘zoon politikan’, which roughly translates to social creature. Under his view, the highest human flourishing is that done in service of humanity, whether this be politics or teaching.
For virtue ethics, character is the central concern. This may seem incomplete, however, as it does not tell us what to do in certain situations. It is good to have a theory of morality that describes what people should aspire to be, but it is equally needed to have one that tells us what to do in tricky moral conundrums. This is where the two remaining schools I look at come into play, namely, Utilitarianism and Deontology.
Part Five: Utilitarianism
Jeremey Bentham who lived from 1748 to 1832 had a novel approach to morality that was different from past versions. He argued that morality is, “not about pleasing God, nor is it about being faithful to abstract rules; instead, it is about making the world as happy as possible.” (Rachels, page 101). For him, this principle of Utility maximizes happiness in the world. James Mill was one of his students. His son, John Stuart Mill (1806 to 1873) argued for the most complete version of Utilitarianism. In 1861 he published Utilitarianism. Here, he put forth that we are not just permitted but required to cause the most happiness in the world. Peter Singer, the contemporary utilitarian, says that, it is not ‘a system of nasty puritanical prohibitions…designed to stop people from having fun.” (Singer, page 1). Classical Utilitarianism can be articulated in three primary statements.
1) The morality of an action depends solely on the consequences of the action; nothing else matters.
2) An action’s consequences matter only insofar as they involve the greater or lesser happiness of individuals.
3) In the assessment of consequences, each individual’s happiness gets equal consideration.
(Rachels, page 118). The theory is remarkably egalitarian, and concise. It gives us guidance on what to do in difficult situations, and tells us how to behave in tricky situations. However, many reject this theory. I’ll look at some of the reasons why, before concluding with why I believe Utilitarianism is defensible.
It can be put forward that the query ‘what things are good’ is different from that of ‘what actions are right.’ Utilitarianism answers the second query by going back to the first. What is right is what is good, and what is good is happiness. Mill says, “The utilitarian doctrine is that happiness is desirable, and the only thing desirable, as an end; all other things being only desirable as means to that end.” (Mill, chapter 4, paragraph 2). This in turn engenders the question, what is happiness? Many see this as simply pleasure. In ancient times, this was known as hedonism. Hedonism is broadly dismissed by most ethical philosophers as insufficient in terms of a guiding ethical philosophy. This is simply because there are things other than pleasure that we also consider important. Some say that right action brings about pleasure, others have articulated goals that are in themselves valuable.
A second critique is that consequences are not all that matter. A Classic thought experiment along these lines is that of the sacrificial lamb and utopia. Imagine that society could be a perfect utopia for all members, but in order to achieve this, one innocent person must be killed every ten years. A strict utilitarian would argue that the ends justify the means, and that the greater good of a utopian society at the expense of a death every ten years would justify this. However, this thought experiment takes us to a place that we are uncomfortable with the conclusions of the strict utilitarian. It reveals that there are things that are more important than coldly tallying what the consequences are. Things like justice, rights, and beauty.
There are still arguments that answer these critiques. Firstly, it is argued that utility is not served by actions that are harmful, even if they promote the greater good. This is because these harmful actions also have consequences. However, this argument is somewhat incomplete as we see that sometimes this is the case, but not always. The second argument is that utilitarianism helps us to determine rules that we should live by, rather than actions to be taken. Here, we don’t look at the results of each specific action, but instead we ask what enumeration of rules is the best? What rules should we construct to promulgate happiness? Under this view, we then evaluate acts according to whether they are in line with these rules. What about exceptions to these rules, however? The rule-utilitarian would put forward that we can have a general rule that a rule can be broken if it is in the best interest of human flourishing. It may be wrong to steal a loaf of bread, but it should certainly not be condemnable to do so to feed your own starving family. The final response to critiques is that common sense needs modification. Smart writes, “Admittedly utilitarianism does have consequences which are incompatible with the common moral consciousness, but I tended to take the view “so much the worse for the common moral consciousness.” That is, I was inclined to reject the common methodology of testing general ethical principles by seeing how they square with our feelings in particular instances.” (Smart, page 10). Smart argues that we must consider why values are important. For him, what makes values important is their consequences. Further, we can’t trust our common place thinking in divergent and extreme cases. We may say all lying is wrong because we have seen negative consequences, but to say this when some lies result in a better world is an incomplete view. Lastly, we should consider every consequence. For the sacrifice and utopia example, is it better to have a world in which everyone is subject to violent death? What if the population in question is over 8 billion, as it is currently, and as such the lottery is 8 billion to one every ten years? We may not say this is an ideal outcome, but considering the full accounting of the situation presented must give us pause. Common sense, values, and weighing all outcomes are all important. If we look backwards in time, or across the world now, we see many situations in which what is publicly acceptable should not be. This was addressed in response to critiques of objective ethics earlier in this paper. Perhaps the lasting guidance of utilitarianism, when revised, is that we should not follow things out of habit, but rather attempt to set up a rational system that tells us not just what to be, but what to do, in the interest of human flourishing.
Part Six: Deontology
Immanuel Kant is the originator of the school of ethical thought called Deontology, or the idea that human beings are special, and that duty to persons is paramount in our evaluation of moral considerations. Humans are better than other animals, and other animals are only valuable in so far as they aid human welfare. Kant says, “But so far as animals are concerned, we have no direct duties. Animals…are there merely as means to an end. That end is man.” (Infield, pages 239 to 240). In brief, people have a degree of dignity that other beings or objects do not have. He argued this based on two positions. Firstly, people desire things, and as such things that meet these desires have value. Objects only have value to the degree that they aid people. Animals are things. Secondly, people have dignity due to the fact that they can act rationally. Kant argued that moral praiseworthiness can only come about is from people acting in goodwill. This is, to be motivated by duty. Were there to be no people, there would be no morality. This is directly in conflict with the ‘transcendental’ school of objective morality, which puts forward that moral truths are true even in the absence of people. But we can reserve this critique for later. For Kant, the Categorical Imperative was the source of all moral considerations. In brief, it is, “Act so that you treat humanity, whether in your own person or in that of another, always as an end and never as a means only.” (Beck, page 46).
What does this mean? It means treating people in good fashion. We must respect them, and refrain from using them, manipulating them, devaluing them, and so on. It does not matter what your goals are, or what the consequences are, we must always treat people with a basic level of respect, based on the type of being that people are. It is important to stipulate, that under Kant we can still use people in the sense of employing them for services and asking for favors and such, because in these circumstances the people freely choose to enter into an agreement, the prohibition comes about when we treat them only as a means to an ends. People should decide things for themselves, and not be forced into activity. Further, we should endeavor to develop ourselves, and not just others.
Bentham said, “all punishment is mischief: all punishment in itself is evil.” (Bentham, page 170). Society punishes people, but it always involves hurting them. This is a core tenant of justice, one component of ethical considerations at the societal level. Kant, however, said, “When, however, someone who delights in annoying and vexing peace-loving folk receives at last a right good beating, it is certainly an ill, but everyone approves of it and considers it as good in itself even if nothing further results from it.” (Beck, page 170). Bentham responds, “if punishment ought at all to be admitted, it ought to be admitted in as far as it promises to exclude some greater evil.” (Bentham, page 171). Kant argued that utilitarianism is in conflict with concerns of human dignity. It makes us consider how to use people. Punishment, in turn, only attempts to reform people into what others want them to be like, rather than allowing them themselves the ability to make that choice. We can punish them and pay them back, but we cannot manipulate them. Kant believes in punishment because guilty people have stepped on other’s dignity, and that the punishment should be proportionate to the crime. “But what is the mode and measure of punishment which public justice takes as its principle and standard? It is just the principle of equality, by which the pointer of the scale of justice is made to incline no more to the one side than the other…Hence it may be said: ‘If you slander another, you slander yourself; if you steal from another, you steal from yourself; if you strike another, you strike yourself; if you kill another, you kill yourself.’ This is…the only principle which…can definitely assign both the quality and the quantity of a just penalty.” (Rachels, page 151). Further, on capital punishment, he says, “Even if a civil society resolved to dissolve itself with the consent of all its members – as might be supposed in the case of a people inhabiting an island resolving to separate and scatter throughout the whole world – the last murderer lying in prison ought to be executed before the resolution was carried out. This ought to be done in order that everyone may realize the desert of his deeds, and that blood-guiltiness may not remain on the people; for otherwise they will all be regarded as participants in the murder…” (Rachels, pages 151-152). In brief, Kant believes justice is not done if the guilty remain unpunished. This is because we must treat people as ends unto themselves, or rational beings who take up the consequences of their actions. To be responsible means to accept this punishment.
In brief, then, Kant gives us another theory, similar to utilitarianism, that tells us what type of actions we should pursue, based on his musings about what type of beings we are. We must treat people with respect, and not as means to an ends, but as responsible beings in and of their own right. As such, punishment is permissible, not because of the consequences it leads to, but because of the way we construe a human being to be constructed. I disagree with Kant’s assessment of the human condition. Under his view, were a murdered come to your door and ask whether their quarry is hiding in your home, Kant would say it is morally justified to tell them yes, because you allow them to make their own decisions and be responsible for their own actions. Or, as articulated above, it wouldn’t be right to steal a loaf of bread to feed your own starving family. Kant’s view forces us to do things that are in conflict with what we intuitively know about moral questions, namely, that sometimes we must do distasteful things in the greater service of human flourishing.
Part Seven: Conclusion
We have seen that Cultural Relativism and Subjectivism are not defensible when considering serious moral quandaries. We have likewise seen that there are numerous approaches to constructing how it is humans can best flourish, and do right action. We have surveyed Virtue Ethics, Utilitarianism, and Deontology, some of the largest names in the field of Ethics.
To me, Deontology fails as a moral system for precisely the reasons I articulate at the end of that section; it does not allow for common sense measures that promote human flourishing. Both Virtue Ethics, and Utilitarianism have something to offer in my view. Virtue Ethics tells us what type of a person to be, while Utilitarianism tells us what types of actions we should pursue. Particularly, Rule Utilitarianism is very appealing as it allows us to nest a system of rules that can take precedence over one another, or facilitate a more nuanced approach to how we are guided to act. Therefore, it is my conclusion that there is such a thing as objective morality, and that this is best served by pursuing both Virtue Ethics and Utilitarianism. In this way, we can discern what it means to flourish as human beings. In this way, we can be guided in what to pursue and how to act. Humans are truly remarkable beings, and there are a whole host of other ethical frameworks that fall outside the bounds of this survey of a paper. Absurdism, Existentialism, Feminism, contemporary Post-Modernism all have their strong and weak points, and I would love to devote more time to detailing them, and debating which components of each theory best serves human beings as a well rounded people. I leave this to the future, and other scholars. For the time being, I am satisfied with the combination of Virtue Ethics and Rule Utilitariansim. It guides me further than other schools, and allows me to flourish, to the best degree possible.
Constructing a system of objective ethics is of paramount importance to the pursuit of policy and policy making, as it allows us to come up with a structure or edifice which, when consulted, gives us direction in terms of how we should act. Should we decrease carbon emissions? Certainly, because they result in harmful consequences. Should we lie in the pursuit of good consequences? Only when that lying would truly be called for, but not otherwise. What type of legislator should I become? One who adheres to certain virtues. Being a policy maker in the absence of a system of morality is a dangerous game, as one can fall sway to Nihilism, and simply act from a place of blind self interest. Having examined the pros and cons of objective ethics, as well as some systems that influence what type of ethics this should be, allows us to better understand how and why to act. It allows us to serve others not coming from a place of self aggrandizement, but a sense of purpose. It allows us to flourish. There is little more praiseworthy that I could imagine.
Part Eight: References
• The Elements of Moral Philosophy, Ninth Edition, James Rachels, McGraw-Hill Education, New York, NY, 2019
• Ethics, A Graphic Guide, Dave Robinson and Chris Garratt, Publishers Group West, Berkeley, CA, 2013
• The Histories, Heroditus, Translated by Aubrey de Selincourt, Penguin Classics, 2003
• Book of the Eskimos, Peter Freuchen, World Pub. Co., 1961
• NY Times series on female genital mutilation, Celia W. Dugger
• Ethics and Language, Charles L. Stevenson, Ams Pr Inc, 1944
• Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong, J. L. Mackie, Penguin Books, 1991
• Objectivity and Truth: You Better Believe It, Ronald Dworkin,
• The Nicomachean Ethics by Aristotle, Translated by Adam Beresford, Penguin Classics, 2020
• Modern Moral Philosophy, Elizabeth Anscombe, 1958
• The Virtues, Peter Geach, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1977
• Plato: The Last Days of Socrates, Hugh Tredennick and Harold Tarrant. New York: Penguin Books, 2003
• Twilight of the Idols, Frederick Nietzsche, translated by Walter Kaufmann in The Portable Nietzsche, New York, Viking Press, 1954.
• Practical Ethics, Peter Singer, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1993
• Utilitarianism, John Stuart Mill
• Utilitarianism: For and Against, J.J.C. Smart and Bernard Williams, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1973
• Lectures on Ethics, Immanuel Kant translated by Louis Infield, New York, Harper and Row, 1963
• Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals, Immanuel Kant translated by Lewis White Beck, Indianapolis, Bobbs-Merril, 1959
• The Principles of Morals and Legislation, Jeremy Bentham, New York, Hafner, 1948
• The Metaphysical Elements of Justice, IImmanuel Kant, translated by John Ladd, Indianapolis, Bobbs-Merril, 1965
• Critique of Practical Reason, Immanuel Kant, translated by Lewis White Beck, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1949