Science and Tech Policy Memo
To Whom It May Concern,
Benjamin Franklin once said, “Those who would give up essential Liberty, to purchase a little temporary Safety, deserve neither Liberty no Safety.” In brief, increasing security constraints on Science and Technology (hereafter S&T) would be tantamount to a strangle hold on the very nature that makes S&T so fruitful and beneficial to our society – the free and open exchange of ideas.
The argument in favor of increasing security around the S&T community must first be articulated before we can examine its pros and cons. In essence, those in favor of this put forth that S&T can be used against the safety and interests of the United States and its population. Therefore, we should restrict all aspects of S&T to conform to the wishes of the security minded. This takes many forms. It may include limiting student visas for both those coming into and out of the country, deciding what can and can’t be published, classifying material and research, limiting international conference participation, and generally discouraging international links for those promoting S&T, particularly for what is deemed a sensitive area. We must ask ourselves, “At what point do scientific openness and free exchange of scientific information pose a risk to national security?” (Neal et al., pg 310)
The pros are limited, given the nature of S&T. They mainly include having more control over an unruly and open system. Potentially dangerous S&T would remain in US hands, and there would be a lesser chance of bad actors using this to damage the US, and its interests, so the argument goes. This would benefit the US in the short term, but the long term aims of the country are antithetical to this. The formulation of a comprehensive S&T system post WWII was facilitated by its value to defense, and The United States invested heavily in science for national security and defense purposes during WWII and the Cold War. It was S&T’s potential to contribute to national security that spawned the current US system for support of research. (Neal et al., pg 318) While this may have been where the modern system was born, this does not mean that we must limit S&T to the degree desired by some. The goal should be a system where S&T can be used for legitimate concerns and preventing opponents from accessing it. This requires a fine balance. Craig Venter, the former president of Celera Genomics said “Some people argue that publishing each genome is like publishing the blueprint to the atomic bomb. But it is also the blueprint for a deterrent and for a cure” (Neal et al., pg 322)
The cons are substantial. “Openness is the very heartbeat of science, the means toward progress, whereas secrecy is the password of the security community, a culture in which the sharing of information jeopardizes safety.” (Neal et al., pg 322) Foreign students who come to the US to study often stay, and improve the workforce. Immigrants make up a significant percentage of the total number of American scientists who have received a Nobel Prize. (Neal et al., pg 323) “Scientists often do not know what they will learn from their work or how their findings will be used until the research is done.” (Neal et al., pg 319) It is the very nature of S&T that collaboration is vital to deeper understandings., and the fostering of nascent technologies. Limiting S&T in the way described in the first paragraph would mean not just the erosion of ties, but would be a direct assault on our national goals – safety, prosperity, development, freedoms we hold dear, and an open world, all of which benefit from S&T collaboration.
In brief, the effects and dangers of pursuing this would be to discourage S&T, and therefore lessen the potential for transformational change in the interest of the US. There are numerous examples to draw upon. One from recent times would be the promulgation of visa restrictions for international students following the 9/11 terrorist attack. President Bush issued Homeland Security Presidential Directive 2, limiting student visas for those receiving training in sensitive areas (particularly concerning weapons of mass destruction). (Neal et al., pg 323) This proved very difficult to enforce, as what fell under the heading of WMD was vague. Consulate officials were asked to more deeply vet applicants, with the result being increased wait times and at times outright cancelation of study in the US. This led to applicants studying, working, and eventually settling abroad in competitor countries. This was not the first time this issue came up. “In January 1982…the State Department asked American universities to deny designated foreign students access to specific courses of study and laboratories and, further, to monitor their movements…(which) were refused in most cases.” (Neal et al., pg 320) In 1982, “the (Panel on Scientific Communication and National Security) concluded that (1) “security by secrecy” would ultimately weaken US technological capabilities; (2) there was no practical way to restrict international scientific communication without disrupting domestic scientific communication; (3) the nation must build “high walls around narrow areas” in pursuit of “security by accomplishment”; and (4) controls should be devised only for “gray areas.” (Neal et al., pg 320) Undertakings like the Human Genome Project and the search for the cause of SARS would not have been completed nearly as quickly without international partnerships. (Neal et al., pg 323) Many of those involved in designing and building the first atomic bomb were immigrants who came here seeking asylum from fascism and war in Europe, including Einstein. (Neal et al., 323)
Three examples of this that are germane to China specifically but also the general world order of S&T development would be the reaction to the Corona Virus, Space issues, and Quantum computing. Taking each in turn, let’s look at the example of the Corona Virus. The virus began in China, but due to a lack of global public health coordination, it rapidly spread across the world. This was a result of the secrecy between China and the US and the suspicion with which they shared information. Beyond the initial spread, the formulation of a successful vaccine could have been greatly ameliorated by intense global collaboration, as was the case with the development of the Pfizer vaccine in partnership with a small German start up. Some countries chose not to collaborate, such as Japan, which sought human trials on Japanese citizens rather than accepting the trials already conducted, leading to a longer roll out and increased loss of life. In the end, much suffering, pain, and even death could have been avoided with more scientific collaboration between countries, rather than less.
Regarding Space, the case is somewhat different. Some countries still collaborate, even in the midst of Russia’s aggression against Ukraine, specifically for the International Space Station. However, this bastion of S&T collaboration is nearing the end of its life, and Russia and China are seeking to make stations that are completely their own. Further, redundant missions to the Moon to profess national supremacy are wasting time and resources that could be better spent on exploring asteroids, or moving on to Mars. Last, there is the issue of satellites, and the current buildup of operational capabilities to cripple or maim what is vital for national security. Were countries to share their information and logistics, rather than hunker down into protectionism, much could be gained. While Space may be the next theater of war, this does not mean that our Space related S&T has to necessarily be hampered by a cold war.
Finally there is the realm of Quantum computing. Again, the US and China seem at odds. Both center the completion of this tech on the national security of the future, but are pursuing competitive and redundant research endeavors that duplicate what each are doing. Were the countries to share their knowledge, a workable tech could be developed for the benefit of all, with clear dual use applications, rather than renewing a cold war style tech buildup that wastes the efforts through duplication of what should be fundamental basic research.
These three examples matter for precisely the same reasons outline in sections one and two above. S&T, at its best, works to make the lives of people better. True, it can also be used against individual countries’ national interests. This debate is perennial and goes back to the first time one group of hominids began using tools. Stone tools could be used to open food, or to attack an enemy. When humanity comes together to share knowledge that would benefit all, we mark ourselves as unique in the animal kingdom. In fact, it may be the very definition of what makes us human. Let us not us S&T as an outpost for novel forms of division, but rather as the firm foundation for a new, and plentiful, global society.
References
Homer A. Neal, Tobin L. Smith, and Jennifer B. McCormick (2008) Beyond Sputnik: U.S. Science Policy in the 21st Century, University of Michigan Press, Ann Arbor.
Additional Reading
Garisto, Daniel. China Is Pulling Ahead in Global Quantum Race, New Studies Suggest. Scientific American. July 15th, 2021. https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/china-is-pulling-ahead-in-global-quantum-race-new-studies-suggest/
Knickmeyer, Ellen. A new space race? China adds urgency to US return to moon. AP, September 15th, 2022. https://apnews.com/article/astronomy-russia-ukraine-space-exploration-science-technology-f98448825e588e8902bb74519b55ba9f
Silver, Laura, Devlin, Kat and Huang, Christine. Americans Fault China for Its Role in the Spread of COVID-19. Pew Research, July 30th, 2020. https://www.pewresearch.org/global/2020/07/30/americans-fault-china-for-its-role-in-the-spread-of-covid-19/